Corruption A Selected and Annotated Bibliography Inge Amundsen and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad Commissioned by NORAD Chr. Michelsens Institute Development Studies and Human Rights CORRUPTION A Selected and Annotated Bibliography Introduction This annotated bibliography on “corruption” is commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, NORAD. It has been compiled from a number of sources, from books and articles, library searches, Internet sources (like Transparency International and the World Bank bibliographies), and from conferences and colleagues.
The bibliography is not meant to be comprehensive; we have aimed at a balanced, assorted, and what we consider an interesting selection. It is organised as follows: Part 1 is an extensive and updated list of the general corruption-related literature. It draws upon most social science disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, as well as law, history and philosophy. This part is divided into one section listing books and one section on articles/reports/working papers. Most of these publications should be easily accessible through a well-equipped library.
Part 2 is a less extensive list of corruption-related literature from Norway’s priority partner countries and other partner countries. It is geographically listed, based on regions and specific countries. To some extent, the imbalanced number of items for the various countries is indicative of what is to be found in each country. Some of this literature is in the form of books and journals, while others are “grey” and may be less easily available. The full Internet address is given wherever possible. Part 3 is a list of the Internet-sites of various anti-corruption organisations.
This is a rich tool for updated information, new publications, news, and for in-depth searches on particular topics and countries. We hope that the bibliography will be considered useful – and used – by aid officials, development practitioners, and researchers. 2 CORRUPTION A Selected and Annotated Bibliography INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 GENERAL LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION……………………………………………………………………. 5 1. 1 1. 2 BOOKS ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5 ARTICLES, REPORTS, WORKING PAPERS ………………………………………………………………………… 12 LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION, WORLD REGIONS ……………………………………………. 34 2. 1 AFRICA, GENERAL ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 34 2. 2 AFRICA: NORWAY’S PRIORITY PARTNER COUNTRIES ………………………………………………………. 0 2. 2. 1 Eritrea…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 40 2. 2. 2 Ethiopia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 40 2. 2. 3 Malawi……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 41 2. 2. 4 Mozambique ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1 2. 2. 5 Tanzania …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 41 2. 2. 6 Uganda ………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………. 45 2. 2. 7 Zambia……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 49 2. 2. 8 Zimbabwe ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 0 2. 3 AFRICA: OTHER PARTNER COUNTRIES …………………………………………………………………………… 51 2. 3. 1 Angola…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51 2. 3. 2 Botswana ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 51 2. 3. 3 Madagascar …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 52 2. 3. Mali ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 52 2. 3. 5 Namibia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 52 2. 3. 6 South Africa …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 53 2. 4 ASIA, GENERAL …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4 2. 5 ASIA: NORWAY’S PRIORITY PARTNER COUNTRIES ………………………………………………………….. 55 2. 5. 1 Bangladesh ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 55 2. 5. 2 Nepal………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 63 2. 5. 3 Sri Lanka ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 63 2. ASIA: OTHER PARTNER COUNTRIES ………………………………………………………………………………. 63 2. 6. 1 India……………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………….. 63 2. 6. 2 Indonesia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 66 2. 6. 3 Cambodia ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 67 2. 6. China ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 67 2. 6. 5 Laos ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 70 2. 6. 6 Pakistan ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 70 2. 6. 7 Vietnam…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 71 2. MIDDLE EAST, GENERAL AND OTHER PARTNER COUNTRIES ……………………………………………… 71 2. 7. 1 Palestinian Territories………………………………………………………………………………………. 72 2. 8 LATIN-AMERICA, GENERAL AND OTHER COUNTRIES ……………………………………………………….. 72 2. 9 LATIN AMERICA: NORWAY’S PRIORITY PARTNER COUNTRIES ………………………………………….. 74 2. 9. 1 Nicaragua ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 2. 10 LATIN-AMERICA: OTHER PARTNER COUNTRIES ………………………………………………………….. 75 2. 10. 1 El Salvador ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75 2. 10. 2 Guatemala ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 76 3 INTERNET SITES ………………………………………………………………….. …………………………………. 76 3 CORRUPTION A Selected and Annotated Bibliography
Introduction This annotated bibliography on “corruption” is commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, NORAD. It has been compiled from a number of sources, from books and articles, library searches, Internet sources (like Transparency International and the World Bank bibliographies), and from conferences and colleagues. The bibliography is not meant to be comprehensive; we have aimed at a balanced, assorted, and what we consider an interesting selection. It is organised as follows: Part 1 is an extensive and updated list of the general corruption-related literature.
It draws upon most social science disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, as well as law, history and philosophy. This part is divided into one section listing books and one section on articles/reports/working papers. Most of these publications should be easily accessible through a well-equipped library. Part 2 is a less extensive list of corruption-related literature from Norway’s priority partner countries and other partner countries. It is geographically listed, based on regions and specific countries.
To some extent, the imbalanced number of items for the various countries is indicative of what is to be found in each country. Some of this literature is in the form of books and journals, while others are “grey” and may be less easily available. The full Internet address is given wherever possible. Part 3 is a list of the Internet-sites of various anti-corruption organisations. This is a rich tool for updated information, new publications, news, and for in-depth searches on particular topics and countries. We hope that the bibliography will be considered useful – and used – by aid officials, development practitioners, and researchers. General literature on corruption 1. 1 Books Anechiarico, Frank & Jacobs, James, B. The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective Chicago, 1996, The University of Chicago Press. This is a comprehensive and controversial case study of American anticorruption efforts. It offers a sceptical assessment of the effectiveness of these. The authors argue that the proliferating regulations and oversight mechanisms designed to prevent or root out corruption seriously undermine our ability to govern.
By constraining decision-makers discretion, shaping priorities, and causing delays, corruption control – no less than corruption itself – undermines efficiency and thereby contributes to the contemporary crisis in public administration. Bibalos, Jeffrey P. & Hussain, Gregory The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Corruption in Transitional Economies Dobbs Ferry/N. Y. , 1997, Oceana Publications Inc. Through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, the USA made it a crime to bribe foreign government officials.
Foreign competitors are in most cases allowed to bribe foreigners, and even entitled to tax deductions on this. The book describes the corrupt “environment” in transitional economies like Russia and China, reviews the provisions of the FCPA, and argues that the insecurity and risks can actually be reduced through the FCPA and other anticorruption initiatives. Finally, the argument is that FCPA can help purge corruption in transitional economies. Numerous references to news articles on corruption in the USA, Europe, Asia and Latin America. Cars, Torsten Mutbrott, bestickning och korruptiv marknadsforing Stockholm, 1996, Juristforlaget.
This juridical outline of Swedish legislation (civil law and tax law) on corruption, bribery and corrupt marketing focuses on actors (corrupted and corrupters in public and private sector), the corrupt act, the bribe, corrupt marketing, sanctions in Swedish penal codes, international relations, and court rulings. (In Swedish with summary in English). Clark, Gordon Accountability and Corruption Sydney, 1998, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. This work addresses ethical standards in the public service, the relationships between officials, their advisors and the public, as well as their interplay between politics and personal behaviour.
Suggestions are offered as to what can be done about corruption in public service. 5 deLeon, Peter Thinking About Political Corruption New York, 1993, M. E. Sharpe Inc. On political corruption in the United States during the Reagan administration, with five cases of national and international corruption. With a strong USoriented perspective, this book gives detailed examples but offers little analytical insight (on for instance whether political corruption in the US is personal or systemic in nature). Della Porta, Donatella & Meny, Ives Democracy and Corruption in Europe London, 1997, Pinter.
This book offers first-rate definitions on corruption. Authors argue that corruption is central to the “vicious circles” that sustain clientelism, electoral fraud, administrative inefficiency and criminal activities. Includes general articles like Jean Cartier-Bresson, “The Economics of Corruption” (which outlines a broad range of economic theories and shows how their precepts may enrich the study of corruption in democratic governments), a few European case studies and Jean-Francois Medard: “France-Africa: Within the Family”. Doig, Alan & Theobald, Robin (eds) Corruption and Democratisation London, 2000, Frank Cass Eds.
This concise edited work deals with the enigmatic relationship between corruption and democracy. On the one hand, democratic power-sharing formulas, institutions and procedures are to a large degree the same as the recommended mechanisms for curbing corruption. On the other hand, political authoritarianism combined with economic controls has been efficient in several third world countries. The book contains three overview articles plus case studies on Uganda, Mozambique, Hong Kong, Botswana, and Australia. Gaetner, Gilles L’argent facile. Dictionnaire de la corruption en France Paris, 1992, Editions Stock.
A journalist’s polemic on corruption in France arranged as a dictionary. Names the places, the individuals (“names-dropping”), the scandals (“affaires”), the institutions (like the cover-up “associations” and the role of public auditing and control bodies) and the sectors affected by corruption (public works, health, sport, justice, politics, journalism, finance, etc). (In French). Gambetta, Diego The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection Cambridge/MASS, 1993, Harvard University Press. Drawing on the confessions of eight Mafiosi, Gambetta develops an analysis of the economic and political role of the Sicilian Mafia.
Illustrative of the corruption in the form of “extortion”, in which the state is not necessarily involved directly. 6 Girling, John Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy London, 1997, Routledge. With a short and concise introduction to corruption and democracy (definitions, analyses and development), the book proceeds to examples of functional corruption (Southeast Asia), dysfunctional corruption (France, Third Republic) and the historical “offsetting” of functional norms (Victorian Britain). Author emphasises the normative dimension (personal moral obligations and symbolic ideas) necessary to eradicate corruption from public life.
In this study the author aims to demonstrate that corruption does not disappear as countries develop and modernise, but rather that corruption takes on new forms. Heidenheimer, Arnold J. ; Johnston, Michael & LeVine, Victor T. (eds) Political Corruption: A Handbook New Brunswick, 1989, Transaction Publishers. This book is a compilation of 56 classic studies on corruption drawn from academic journals and books, including the pioneer articles by Samuel P. Huntington:“ Modernization and corruption” and Gunnar Myrdal: “Corruption as a hindrance to modernization in South Asia” and “Corruption: Its causes and effects”.
It is particularly useful for its interdisciplinary approach. Heywood, Paul (ed. ) Political Corruption Oxford, 1997, Blackwell Publishers. Drawing on insights from the fields of political science, game theory, economics, sociology and law, this book provides a framework for the analysis of political corruption. It examines how political corruption can be defined and how it operates in practice. Jain, Arvind K. (ed) Economics of Corruption Norwell, Massachusetts, 1998, Kluwer Academic Publishers. The politcal economy of corruption is examined, focusing on causes and consequences of corruption, and measures to curb corruption.
A shift in the focus of studies on corruption is proposed, – away from bribery-type activities to corruption that results in distortion of economic policies. Kimberley, Ann Elliott (ed) Corruption and the Global Economy Washington DC, 1997, The Institute for International Economics. Views of different analysts are represented in this concise book, which is the outcome of a conference on corruption hosted by the Institute for International Finance in April 1996. Theorists, economists, lawyers, and even an insightful detective present arguments.
Includes the chapter by Michael Johnston: “Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet”, that argues forcefully that any assessment of corruption must take a country’s political dimensions into account. To make this argument, Johnston asserts that it is critical to understand who decides on corrupt distributions and who gets what from corruption. He concludes that to 7 combat corruption an analysis of the distribution of benefits is necessary to formulate a feasible, multi-dimensional effort.
Also includes the chapter by Glyn/Kobrin/Naim: “The Globalization of Corruption” on how and why corruption erupts worldwide, and the chapter by Michael Johnston: “Public Officials, Public Interests and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meets”. Klitgaard, Robert Controlling Corruption Berkeley, 1988, University of California Press. Corruption is increasingly recognised as a pre-eminent problem in the developing world. This seminal book on the subject has shaped much of the thinking about corruption for students and practitioners since its publication.
Bribery, extortion, fraud, kickbacks, and collusion have resulted in retarded economies, predator elites, and political instability. In this book, Klitgaard provides a framework for designing anti-corruption policies, and describes through various case studies how courageous policymakers were able to control corruption. The book uses various case samples including the Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Among the lessons the book contributes to thinking about corruption is the notion that the costs of eliminating corruption are excessively high and an optimal level of control is possible.
Kofele-Kale, Ndiva International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes. Holding Heads of State and Other High Ranking State Officials Individually Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment The Hague, 1995, Kluwer Law International. Addressing the problem of indigenous spoilation (plunder) by heads of states and other high-ranking officials of the wealth of the states, which they are temporarily the custodians, Kofele-Kale argues that indigenous spoilation can be made a crime according to international law.
International law is weak, however, and limited in addressing the economic crimes and pursuing the assets of local (and exiled) dictators. Some excellent examples of grand corruption is given. Ledeneva, Alena V. Russia’s Economy of Favours. Blat, Networking and Informal Change Cambridge, 1998, Cambridge University Press. “Blat” is the informal contacts-, barter and network system used to obtain goods and services under the rationing in the former Soviet Union, an “economy of favours”.
The book deals at lengths with the Soviet “blat” system, comparing it to clientelism and corruption, and adds a chapter on the implications of this system of networking on modern Russia. Levi, Michael & Nelken, David The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption Oxford, 1996, Blackwell Publishers. This work aims to bring out specific and general elements of the social and legal control of corruption. It looks at the socio-economic-political-pressure group influences around communities and shifts, for example, what is called 8 the politics of corruption.
Thus, the primary orientation is not the forms of corrupt behaviour or their explanation, but forms and “causes” which are salient to socio-legal reaction and its effects. McChesney, Fred S. Money for Nothing. Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion Cambridge/MASS, 1997, Harvard University Press. On lobbying, campaign contributions, and corruption in the USA. According to the author, payments to politicians are made not only to gain political favours, but also to avoid political disfavours, that is, as part of a system of political extortion or “rent extraction”.
Thus the basic notion of rent extraction as “money for nothing”: money paid in exchange for politicians’ inaction. This book illustrates some patterns of legal extortion underlying the current fabric of interest-group politics. Moody-Stuart, George Grand Corruption: How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries Oxford, 1997, World View Publishing. A most readable popular manual of the way in which grand/high-level corruption works, and how business and government leaders feed off each other in a mutual dance of bribe and extortion.
Author suggests the use of moral pressure and institutional oversight to check the cycle of abuse. Ofusu-Amaah, W. ; Paatii, Raj Soopramanien & Uprety, Kishor Combating Corruption. A Comparative Review of Selected Legal Aspects of State Practice and major International Initiatives Washington DC, 1999, The World Bank. This study discusses how corruption is investigated and reviews anticorruption legislation, sanctions and penalties, using examples of best practice from several jurisdictions. Furthermore, it examines the national laws relative to financial management, political campaign finance, and public procurement.
Finally, international efforts against corruption are discussed, emphasising the UN and the OECD initiatives, and regional efforts within the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States and the African initiative. Perry, Peter J.. Political Corruption and Political Geography Aldershot, 1997, Ashgate Publishing Group. This work aims to define, describe, and to expose political corruption in the context of global politics. The author also suggests “cures and controls” for corruption at varying levels, and offers afterthoughts on the future of political corruption.
Pope, J. (ed. ) National Integrity Systems: The TI Source Book Washington DC, 1997 (Second Ed. ), Transparency International & EDI/World Bank. This sourcebook on integrity emphasises accountability measures and attitude changes over the reform of substantive programs to reduce corrupt incentives. Five main areas of reform on the road to the implementation of an anticorruption system are flagged: public programs, government reorganisation, 9 law enforcement, public awareness, and the creation of institutions to prevent corruption.
It is pointed out that one must remember that anti-corruption is a long-term process that needs to be openly supported from the top and one where attitudes and conduct must be taught and reinforced at all levels. Rider, Barry (ed. ) Corruption: The Enemy Within The Hague, 1997, Kluwer. Includes papers from the 14th International Symposium on Economic Crime, Cambridge 1996, where corruption is seen mainly from a Western perspective, as serious economic crime and legal and financial offences. The first part identifies corruption as an antisocial activity in developing and transitional economies, and its implications.
The second part addresses the relationship of corruption to organised crime. The third part takes up the issue of public sector corruption, and particularly the finance sector. The fourth part focuses on aspects of prevention and enforcement (strategies in the US and UK) and the fifth part is on international initiatives (role of the World Bank, criminalisation of foreign bribes, Interpol and the EU). Robinson, Mark (ed. ) Corruption and Development London, 1998, Frank Cass. This edited volume is inter-disciplinary in its approach to analysing corruption.
The message conveyed is that corruption is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon that pervades all societies to varying degrees, which is not amenable to quick-fix solutions. Contributors include Mushtaq Khan, Johann Lambsdorff, John Toye and Mick Moore, Fredrik Galtung and Stephen Riley. Rose-Ackerman, Susan The Political Economy of Corruption New York, 1978, Academic Press. This seminal book from 1978 on the political economy of corruption presents the idea that corruption exists at the interface of public and private sectors.
The central argument is that corruption cannot be entirely eliminated; the cost of doing so would be excessively high. However, corruption may be reduced to a level that controls its costs and does not harm an economy. It is a statement that has influenced a significant number of subsequent studies on corruption and is therefore critical for anyone who wishes to understand the subject in any depth. Rose-Ackerman, Susan Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences and Reform Cambridge, 1999, Cambridge University Press.
This is a major reference work on corruption. It looks at governmental corruption as an economic, cultural and political problem that limits investment and growth and leads to ineffective government. The book includes chapters on the role of international actors both as possible corrupters and as reform supporters in international politics and through development cooperation and aid. 10 Schedler, Andreas; Diamond, Larry & Plattner, Marc F. (eds) The Self-restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies London, 1999, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
This edited volume is based on papers presented to the conference “Institutionalising horizontal accountability: How democracies can fight corruption and the abuse of power”, held in Vienna in 1997. Liberal democracies require governments that are not only accountable to their citizens but also subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. These are referred to as institutions of ”horizontal” accountability, and refer to the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government.
Instead of analysing the role of parliaments in overseeing the executive, this book focuses on independent, non-elective, specialised bodies of oversight, including electoral administrations, judicial systems, anticorruption bodies and central banks. These autonomous institutions of accountability are typically insulated from state officials and from the people as well. As long as they are unaccountable themselves, agencies of accountability are therefore vulnerable to charges that they are undemocratic. A key question raised is: Who shall guard the guardians? Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W.
The Grabbing Hand. Government Pathologies and Their Cures Cambridge, Mass. , 1998, Harvard University Press. This collection of essays by the two economists describe many public sector interventions in economic life as predatory: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. With some examples drawn from medieval Europe and transition economies, this contribution to economic theory has a historic and comparative approach to corruption.
Scott, James C. Comparative Political Corruption Englewood Cliffs/NJ, 1972, Prentice-Hall. This (old) contribution looks at corruption as a channel of political demands, and argues that patterns of exclusion in the formal political apparatus lead groups to resort to corruption or violence. Main focus is on electoral corruption in the form of political “machines”, through which for instance the bourgeoisie buys political influence. Includes comparative studies from Early Stuart England, Thailand, Haiti and the USA, India. Stapenhurst, Rick and Sahr J. Kpundeh (eds) Curbing Corruption.
Toward a Model for Building National Integrity EDI Development Studies. Washington DC, 1999, World Bank. This volume contains theoretical and applied studies of governance work. The book is organised in three parts. Part I presents lessons of experience, highlighting the interaction between corruption and economic performance. Examples of good practice are illustrated by the experiences of Hong Kong, Singapore and Bolivia. Part II focuses on economic and institutional approaches to anti-corruption efforts, paying particular attention to the public sector and civil society (including media).
Part III presents three country case 11 studies – Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda. Surprisingly, and very unconvincing, Tanzania and Uganda are presented as success stories in curbing corruption. Theobald, Robin (ed. ) Corruption, Development and Inequality: Soft touch or hard graft? London, 1990, Macmillan. The basic argument of this book is that the phenomenon of political corruption can be understood only against a background of social and economic change. Both the negative and positive sides of corruption are listed and reviewed.
Theobald also identifies a number of remedial measures to control corruption although arguing that its elimination cannot be realistically anticipated until certain fundamental changes have taken place. The most important of these are the rise of predominance of universalistic norms, the emergence of new centres of power outside the bureaucracy and the development of competitive party politics. Such changes, however, can come about only after a long period of social and economic development. Ward, Peter M.
Corruption, Development and Inequality London, 1989, Routledge. There is vigorously debated whether corruption in all cases is detrimental to the interests of the poor or whether, in some cases, corruption might actually facilitate development. Many people argue, sensibly, that the ‘informal sector’ is a good thing for employment and housing; but there is more disagreement about corruption and the black economy. This book explores this debate and presents much new evidence and thinking connected with the topic.
It considers corruption in a wide range of international examples from the USSR to Ecuador and India, thereby demonstrating its extent, its many different manifestations, the roles it fulfils and its consequences, which, the book argues, are in most cases decidedly adverse. Webber, Carolyn & Wildavsky, Aaron A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World New York, 1986, Simon and Schuster. This seminal book illuminates the field of government taxation and expenditure from ancient Mesopotamia to today.
The historical analysis relates fiscal systems to the societies and political regimes in which they were embedded and to the development of governments’ administrative capacities. 1. 2 Articles, reports, working papers Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella “Causes and Consequences of Corruption: A Review of Empirical Contributions” IDS Bulletin, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1996, pp. 6-11. This paper reviews the empirical literature on corruption to show how new data sets are contributing to robust studies and testing of hypotheses. 12 Alam, M. S. Some Economic Costs of Corruption” Journal of Development Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, October 1990, pp. 89-97. This article argues that bribery cannot improve a country’s economic efficiency through the creation of auction-like conditions. It takes the position that the patrimonial/clientelist character of many developing countries restricts access to bribery and reduces the possibilities of detection. Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? ” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Working Paper no. 7108, 1999.
Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is ‘no’.
Amundsen, Inge “Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues” Bergen, 1999, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Working Paper 1999:7. Political corruption is here defined as corruption in which the political decision-makers are involved. In addition to a review of the various definitions of corruption and a classification of the various forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion), this paper presents two alternative theories on corruption (“extractive” and “redistributive”), and some of the causes and effects of corruption.
Finally, the various sources of anticorruption initiatives and endowments are discussed. The basic argument is that political corruption can only be checked and reduced by further democratisation and concerted efforts. Andvig, Jens Chr. Korrupsjon i utviklingsland. En okonomisk tiln? rming. Del 1: Begrepsavklaring. Politisk korrupsjon Oslo, 1982, NUPI notat nr. 249. Definitions and core aspects/conceptualisations of political corruption: “traditional” corruption, market corruption, principal-agent theory, rent seeking, bureaucratic/political corruption, kleptocracy. (In Norwegian).
Andvig, Jens Christopher & Moene, Karl Ove “How Corruption May Corrupt” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, no13, 1990, pp. 63-76 (NUPI rapport no. 134, 1989). This article presents the argument that the same socio-economic structures can result in different levels of corruption. The authors develop the economic hypothesis that the same socio-economic structure can give rise to different levels of corruption, in other words that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria levels are possible. 13 Andvig, Jens Christopher “The Economics of Corruption: A Survey” Studi economici, vol. 6, no. 4-3, 1991. This literature review concentrates primarily on the literature in economics. The author divides the literature into themes of situational analysis, public contracts, queues, status of agents, institutional explanations, cultural differences or norm-based explanations, specific models of multiple equilibrium models of corruption, the welfare economics of corruption, and empirical investigations of corruption. Andvig, Jens Christopher “Economic Analysis of Corruption” Arve Ofstad & Arne Wiig (eds): Development theory: Recent Trends.
Proceedings of the NFU Annual Conference 1992. CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute) Report R 1993:6, chapter 12, pp. 228-253. After reviewing the general explanations for variations in the level of corruption according to variations between political systems, levels of economic development, cultural patterns, this article looks into the economic explanations of corruption: situational analysis, incentives, and the Shelling diagram. Andvig, Jens Christopher “Corruption in the North Sea Oil Industry. Issues and Assessment” Crime, Law and Social Change, 1995, pp. 89-313. The report explores the issue of economically motivated bribery in the Norwegian (and British) oil industry directed at middle-level management. Focuses on the sealed bid auction system, and information brokers. Important as it illustrates some mechanisms of corruption in high-value raw-material production, and illuminates incentive problems in tender-systems, which are also relevant when analysing public procurement. Banerjee, Abhijit V. “A Theory of Misgovernance” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, no. 4, 1997, pp. 1289-1332.
The paper develops a theoretical model to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape, corruption and lack of incentives. The model identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation: (1) The fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail, and (2) the presence of agency problems within the government. It is shown that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people. Bardhan, Pranab “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 5, (Sept) 1997, pp. 1320-1346. This article is a useful review of the economic literature on corruption. It divides the literature among five general issues: corruption and efficiency, corruption and growth, national differences in corruption, policy issues in reducing corruption, and incentives for reducing corruption. Task managers will find this article to be an excellent introduction into a large and highly varied literature on the subject. 14 Becker, Gary S. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 76, no. , March-April 1968, pp. 169-217. This classic article analyses the relationship between punishment and an individual’s willingness to engage in an illegal act. It asks what is the optimal level of punishment to deter crime. The optimal level of punishment is largely a function of the cost of enforcement, investigation, and punishment. It concludes that the optimal levels of sanction depend upon the overall cost of enforcement. Bhagwati, Jagdish N. “Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 90, no. 5, 1982, pp. 988-1002.
This paper provides taxonomy of DUP activities. These activities include the use of funds for lobbying for protection, market share, licenses, and monopolistic barriers to market. The basic characteristic is that DUP activities use funds to for rent seeking and bribery with an aim of making a profit. Bliss, Christopher and Rafael Di Tella “Does Competition Kill Corruption? ” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, no. 51, October 1997, pp. 1001-1023. This article is useful for staff who wants to understand the relationship between corruption and competition.
It offers an explanation of under what circumstances competition may limit the costs of corruption. Busch, Gary K. “Crime and Corruption: One View of a Parallel System” 1992, Mimeo, Transparency International. This paper looks at the internationalisation of corruption and crime. It looks specifically at four fields: fraud in construction, maritime fraud, money laundering, and ‘parlour-room crime’ (fake antiquities, art, etc. ). Campos, J. Edgardo & Line, Donald “The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters” World Development, vol. 27, no. 6, 1999, pp. 1059-1067.
The paper argues and provides empirical evidence that it is not only the level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption. Different corruption regimes have different effects on investment. Corruption regimes that are more predictable have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable. The level of corruption also matters. Cartier-Bresson, Jean “Corruption Networks, Transaction Security and Illegal Social Exchange” Political Studies, no. 65, 1997, pp. 463-476. This article argues that most studies of corruption concentrate on occasional and unorganised behaviour.
It analyses instead networks of corrupt actors who interact in regular, organised corruption. The article concludes that the study of networks has more to offer for an understanding of corruption than the classic political economy approach. 15 Carvajal, Raul “Large-scale Corruption: Definition, Causes, and Cures” Systemic Practice and Action Research, vol. 12, nr. 4, 1999, pp. 335-353. Through a review of the literature, the author derives a definition of corruption, and argues that the same governing factors that sustain largescale corruption are in direct opposition to efforts to promote development.
By reviewing the history and evolution of a government agency for small farmers in a developing country, author shows that while extracting wealth, corrupt power networks generated waste, reduced production, and caused acrimony on the part of the victims. The ability to detect and neutralise corrupt networks is essential to development. Chand, Sheetal & Moene, Karl O. “Controlling Fiscal Corruption” World Development, vol. 27, no. 7, July1999, pp. 1129-1140. This paper examines the issue of how to control fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. A model is developed to portray the incentive effects.
The results indicate that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a “virtuous circle”. These findings are supported by a case study of a successful attack on fiscal corruption in Ghana. Cooksey, Brian “Does Aid Cause Corruption? ” East African Alternatives, no. 2, January-February 1999 (Nairobi). The author argues that aid has fuelled corruption in recipient countries, and allowed incumbent ruling elites to buttress themselves against the logic of market reform political pluralism. e Sardan, J. P. Olivier ”L’economie morale de la corruption en Afrique” Politique Africaine, no. 63, October 1996, pp. 97-116. This French anthropologist explores the cultural “embeddedness” of corruption in Africa, arguing that corruption includes a broad range of power abuse and illegal enrichment that is generalised and commonplace. He notes the inconsistency between outspoken condemnation of corruption and the widespread practice in Africa, noting that people who take part in the practice believe it is legitimate or denies that their practice is corruption. Dye, K. & Stapenhurst, R. Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption” Washington DC, 1998, World Bank Institute Working Paper. Building strong institutions is a central challenge of development and is key to controlling corruption. Among public institutions, the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) may play a critical role, as they help promote sound financial management and thus accountable and transparent government. However, the authors argue that the full potential of the SAI to address corruption has not been exploited, in part because of the lack of understanding of the overall capacity of the SAI.
This paper discusses the role 16 of SAIs in promoting accountability and transparency within government. Furthermore, it considers some of the factors making for effective SAIs and highlights the linkages between the audit institutions and other “pillars of integrity”, notably the media and Parliament. Eskeland, Gunnar & Thiele, Henrik “Corruption under Moral Hazard” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2204. This is theoretical analysis based on the principal-agent framework.
The model shows that attempts to reduce corruption within an institution need to address the constraints facing managers in setting rewards and penalties. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits. Evans, Peter B. & Rausch, James E. “Bureaucratic Structures and Economic Performance in Less Developed Countries” IRIS (Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, University of Maryland), Working Paper No. 175, August 1995. This study assesses the extent to which internal promotion and meritocratic recruitment improve the functioning of a bureaucracy.
It concludes that a better performing public sector, with rational promotion and recruitment, has less corruption. Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge “Korrupsjon”, chapter 13 in Rune J. Hagen & Karl R. Pedersen (eds): Fordeling og vekst i fattige land, Bergen, 1998, Fagbokforlaget. This paper discusses the causes and consequences of corruption in developing countries, and possible means of reducing corruption in the public sector. Principal-agent theory (incentive theory) is used as a point of departure. The impact of corruption on economic performance is also discussed.
By comparing corruption and economic performance in African and Asian countries, the paper argues that the corruption-growth relationship depends not only on the scope but also on the form of corruption. This suggests that high levels of corruption can coexist with either high or low rates of growth, depending on how corruption is organised and how the money is used. (In Norwegian). Friedman, E. ; Johnson, S. ; Kaufmann, D. & Zoido-Lobaton, P. “Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank Institute Working Paper.
Based on data from 69 countries, it is found that entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the “Grabbing Hand” in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total GDP. As a result, corrupt governments become small governments. 17 Gillespie, Kate and Gwenn Okruhlik “The Political Dimensions of Corruption Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis” Comparative Politics, October 1991, pp. 77-95. This article provides a conceptual framework to analyse anti-corruption campaigns within governments and across states.
It explores the political variables involved in anti-corruption campaigns and is useful for understanding the politics of reducing official venality. Global Forum on Fighting Corruption “Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials” Department of State, Publication 10600, Washington DC, 1999. This report is summarising a conference organised by the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, hosted by Vice President Al Gore, Washington D. C. February 24-26. (Internet site: http://www. usia. gov/topical/econ/integrity).
The conference, with participants from 90 governments, focused on causes of corruption and practices to prevent or fight it. A list of twelve general principles was assembled into the document “Guiding principles for fighting corruption and safeguarding integrity among justice and security officials” which is included in this report. Gray, Cheryl W. & Kaufmann, Daniel “Corruption and Development” Finance and Development, March 1998, pp. 7-10. A short and concise article on the principal causes of corruption.
The article makes some suggestions of specific ways to enhance anti-corruption efforts in developing and transition economies. Gupta, Sanjeev; Davoodi, Hamid & Alonso-Terme, Rosa “Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? ” IMF Working paper, 98/76. Washington, May 1998, International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept. This paper demonstrates that high and rising corruption increases income inequality and poverty by reducing economic growth, the progressivity of the tax system, the level of effectiveness of social spending, and the formation of human capital.
These findings hold for countries with different growth experiences, at different stages of development, and using various indices of corruption. An important implication of these results is that policies that reduce corruption will also lower income inequality and poverty. Hampton, Mark P. “Where Current Meets: The Offshore Interface between Corruption, Offshore Finance Centres and Economic Development” IDS Bulletin, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1996, pp. 78-87. This is a preliminary step to analyse the possible impact on economic development of the linkage between offshore interface (finance centres & tax heavens) and corruption.
Moral outrage at the “cancer of corruption” needs to be considered alongside the double standards of Western companies that routinely supply bribes to win contracts in poor countries, thus prolonging rent-seeking behaviour. It is argued that the growth of offshore interface may be outpacing any attempts at regulation, whether by the business communities or governments. 18 Holloway, Richard “NGOs: Loosing the Moral High Ground-Corruption and Misrepresentation” Paper presented at the 8th IACC, Lima, Peru, 1997.
This paper looks at corruption in NGOs, and argues that the NGO sector, which we expect to have high moral values, and to occupy the moral high ground, has started to have increasing numbers of crooks, charlatans and impostors within its ranks. Thus, the author argues that there is a need for a more sceptical, objective view of the NGO-sector without both romanticism on the one hand, or cynicism on the other – a clear appreciation of its strengths and weaknesses. Heidenheimer, Arnold J. “The Topography of Corruption: Explorations in a Comparative Perspective” International Social Science Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, September 1996, pp. 338-347. The article analyses how corruption is linked to scandalsation in the traditions of European countries and how this has helped shape contemporary perceptions. Britain and Italy are contrasted in how they maintained or transmuted patron-client relationships and monitored distinctions between social, economic and political exchange. The comparative analysis is extended to encompass regional variations within Italy, as manifested by differing levels of trust and tolerance of deviations from public office obligations.
Different patterns of monitoring bureaucratic behaviour help explain why low-level corruption is less prevalent in France than in Italy, but also why problem consciousness has developed more among Italians. The topographic scope of the survey is then extended beyond national borders with reference to whether and how European governments responded to international pressures to monitor the bribery of official’s abroad. Supplementary indicators of national tendencies to combat corruption are extrapolated from data about the willingness of national elites to control practices by representatives of their companies in developing countries.
With some notes on international legislation against corruption (including Transparency International and OECD efforts). Jamieson, Alison “Political Corruption in Western Europe. Judiciary and Executive in Conflict” Conflict Studies, no. 128, 1996 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. London, 1996, RISCT. Short essay on the problem of autonomy of the judiciary and the personal risks of investigating magistrates confronted with increasing corruption and organised crime in Europe, with case studies of Italy, France, Spain and others.
Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann and Paplo Zoido-Lobaton “Corruption, public finances, and the Unofficial Economy” Policy Research Working Paper 2169 Washington DC, 1999, World Bank, World Bank Institute. Based on data from 49 Latin American, OECD, and transition economies, the study explores the impacts of taxation and bribery on the size of the unofficial economy. The study finds that it is the effective and discretionary administration of tax and regulatory regimes, not higher taxes alone, as well 19 as corruption, which increases the size of the unofficial economy.
Furthermore, countries with a larger unofficial economy tend grow more slowly. Johnston, Michael “The Search for Definitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption” International Social Science Journal, no. 149, September 1996, pp. 321-336. This article explores the multiple problems that confront efforts to define corruption in a meaningful fashion. It is useful for understanding the complexity of defining corrupt behaviour. Johnston, Michael “Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet” in Kimberley, Ann Elliott (ed) 1997.
This chapter argues that any assessment of corruption must take a country’s political dimensions into account. To make this argument, Johnston asserts that it is critical to understand who decides on corrupt distributions and who gets what from corruption. He concludes that to combat corruption an analysis of the distribution of benefits is necessary to formulate a feasible, multi-dimensional effort. Kaufmann, Daniel & Siegelbaum, Paul “Privatisation and Corruption in Transition Economies” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 2, winter 1995, pp. 419-458.
Privatisation was effectively forced upon the transition economies after the break-up of the Soviet Union. This paper presents an analysis of different privatisation techniques and how those methods have affected the incidence of corruption. It concludes that despite the incidence of corruption that followed privatisation, the policies were positive for the transition economies. Kaufmann, Daniel “Corruption: the Facts” Foreign Policy, no. 107, summer 1997, pp. 114-131. This paper explains the costs of corruption, rejecting arguments that corruption “greases” development, that reforms breed bribery, and that corruption cannot be controlled.
Having exposed the “myths” about corruption, the paper argues that reducing venal behaviour requires the involvement of civil society and a mix of programs including liberalisation, deregulation, and tax, budget, institutional, civil service, and legal reforms. Kaufmann, Daniel “Challenges in the Next Stage of Anti-Corruption” Washington DC, 1998, World Bank Institute Working Paper. The paper argues that corruption flourishes where policies provide incentives for it and restraining institutions are weak.
Diagnosing corruption may thus help a country understand the shortcomings in its policies and institutions, and on that basis design a strategy to strengthen the state’s performance. 20 Kaufmann, D. ; Kraay, A. & Zoido-Lobaton, P. “Governance Matters” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank Institute Working Paper. This paper describes a new database containing over 300 governance indicators compiled from a variety of sources. The paper provides a detailed description of each of these indicators and sources, and constructs six aggregate indicators corresponding to six basic governance concepts.
It is found that governance, as measured by these indicators, matters. In a crosssection of over 150 countries, new empirical evidence is provided of a strong causal relationship between better governance and better development outcomes. Kaufmann, Daniel & Shang-Jin Wei “Does ‘Grease Money’ Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? ” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Working Paper No. 7093, 1999. Using data from three worldwide firm-level surveys, the paper examines the relationship between bribe payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital.
It is found that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital. Khan, Mushtaq H. “A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries” IDS Bulletin, vol. 27, no. 2, 1996, pp. 12-21. Defining corruption in behavioural terms as deviations from legal norms, the article analyses the economic effects of corruption in terms of patrimonial and clientelist relationships, rent seeking, agency structures and the distribution of political power.
The argument is that some forms of “controlled” corruption may be economically efficient. Klitgaard, Robert “Cleaning up and Invigorating the Civil Service” Public Administration and Development, no. 17, 1997, pp. 487–509. The development agenda is moving from policy-based reform to institutional reform. The paper asserts that a reform of incentives and information, implicit in civil service reform, will decrease the incidence of corruption in developing economies. Klitgaard, Robert “’Unanticipated Consequences’ in Anti-Poverty Programs” World Development, no. 25, vol. 12, December 1997, pp. 1963-1972.
This article examines unanticipated effects of anti-poverty programmes conducted by multilateral donors. It asserts that the unexpected effects may include a variety of distortions, including increased corruption. When an official acquires discretionary power over a good or service, corruption may result as a consequence of diminished accountability. 21 Klitgaard, Robert “International Cooperation Against Corruption” Paper presented at the International Conference “Democracy, Market Economy and Development”, 26-27 February 1999, Seoul, South Korea. Why don’t countries take more steps to reduce corruption?
If countries have trouble fighting corruption, it may be because they lack sufficient will or sufficient local capacities, such as proper strategies and structures (including incentives), to prevent corruption. In some instances, local capacities are constrained by costs, in others by a lack of know-how, and in still others by insufficient efforts to devise strategies to combat corruption. It is argued that international co-operation can help individual countries to develop the necessary will and capacities. The article proposes several new initiatives in which international co-operation could play crucial roles in combating corruption.
One is the sponsorship of regional diagnostic studies. These studies would help identify systematic improvements that might be made and suggest how to ensure the permanence of improvements through monitoring. Kofele-Kale, Ndiva “Partimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoilation” in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 28, no. 45, 1995, pp. 45-118. Author claims that massive corruption and presidential graft can and should be named “patrimonicide” (along with “genocide”) or “indigenous spoilation”, and that international legislation should be developed to overcome this problem.
Much legal technicalities here, but also with some excellent examples of presidential graft, leaders’ economic predation, corruption and primitive extraction (mainly from Africa). Kpundeh, Sahr J. “Political Will in Fighting Corruption” Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries Seminar paper, UNDP, October 1997. http://magnet. undp. org/Docs/efa/corruption/Chapter06. pdf Author argues that political actors or leaders can rely on an arsenal of resources to develop and implement sustainable economic reform and anticorruption strategies.
The necessary political will among political leaders nevertheless depends on the types and levels of corruption, leaders’ security, democratic checks and balances, public constituencies and participation, an independent press, and transparent accountable government. Krueger, Anne O. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society” American Economic Review, no. 64, vol. 3, June 1974, pp. 291-303. This seminal article introduces the concept of rents that are present in government monopolies. Competitive rent seeking is a factor in societies where governments control sectors of the economy.
The article analyses the opportunities created through state-owned enterprises, quantitative restrictions, and tariffs that lead to rent seeking. 22 Kurer, Oskar “Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources” Public Choice, vol. 77, no. 2, 1993, pp. 259-273. This article shows the errors of what Kurer calls the “revisionist approach” to corruption. The revisionist approach – notably Leff, Nye, and others – argues that corruption enhances market efficiency. The author argues convincingly that the revisionist approach is misleading and that corruption carries high costs, especially for developing economies.
Kurer, Oskar “The Political Foundations of Economic Development Policies” Journal of development studies, vol. 32, nr. 5, 1996, pp. 645-668. The article argues that the adoption and persistence of many failed development strategies can be attributed to political clientelism, factionalism, corruption and the exchange of material benefits for political support. A political economy theoretical contribution on predatory states, extraction and clientelism, with no examples. Lambsdorff, Johan Graf “Corruption in Empirical Research – A Review” Paper presented at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Durban, 10-15 October 1999.
This paper reviews a large variety of studies on causes and consequences of corruption. Research on the causes of corruption focuses on the absence of competition, policy distortions, political systems, and public salaries as well as an examination of colonialism and gender. The studies on the consequences of corruption include research on the impact of corruption on investment, economic growth, institutional quality, government expenditure, poverty and international flows of capital, goods and aid. Langseth, P. ; Stapenhurst, R. & Pope, J. “The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption” Washington DC, 1997, EDI/World Bank.
This paper argues that while each country or region is unique in its own history and culture, its political systems, and its stage of economic and social development, similarities do exist and that experience and lessons are often transferable. A “national integrity system” is proposed as a comprehensive method of fighting corruption. It comprises eight pillars (public awareness, public anti-corruption strategies, public participation, “watchdog” agencies, the judiciary, the media, the private sector, and international co-operation) which are interdependent.
Establishing and strengthening such an integrity system requires identifying opportunities for reinforcing and utilising each of these pillars in the fight against corruption. Langseth, P. & Stapenhurst, R. “National Integrity System Country Studies” Washington DC, 1997, World Bank Institute Working Paper. This paper builds on the paper “The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption”, which argues that while each country or region is unique in its own history and culture, its political systems, and its stage of economic and social development, similarities with regard to the extent and 3 costs of corruption do exist and that experience and lessons are often transferable. The paper presents two country studies, those of Uganda and Tanzania, highlighting the problem of corruption in those countries, the strategies adopted to fight corruption, and the role that the World Bank Institute has played in assisting with the implementation of those strategies. Leiken, Robert S. “Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic” Foreign Policy, no. 105, Winter 1996-1997, pp. 55-73. A highly readable article that argues that an explosion in the incidence of corruption has occurred worldwide.
The two main reasons for this explosion are the higher disclosures of malfeasance because of the end of the Cold War, and the global spread of democracy. Leite, Carlos & Weidmann, Jens “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth” IMF Working Paper, WP/99/85, July 1999. The paper argues that natural resource abundance creates opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour and is an important factor in determining a country’s level of corruption. In a simple growth model, it is shown that the extent of corruption depends on natural resource abundance, government polices, and the concentration of bureaucratic power.
Furthermore, the growth effects of natural resource discoveries and anti-corruption polices crucially depend on the economy’s state of development. Leys, Colin “What is the Problem About Corruption? ” Journal of Modern African Studies, no. 3, vol. 2, 1965, pp. 215-230. Among the earliest statements on corruption as an efficiency-enhancing market behaviour. The essay concludes that corruption is a positive developmental force by creating competition and market structures for private sector actors.
Lord Nolan “Just and Honest Government” Public Administration and Development, no. 18, 1998, pp. 447-455. The paper addresses the ways in which the United Kingdom has sought to apply principles such as ethics and values as the foundation of a strong public sector. The evolution of values, specifically the tensions between old and new values, and the ethical challenges brought about by the new pubic administration and management is discussed. Lui, Francis T. “An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery”
