Terrorist Threats Historical Perspective
Terrorism is never a new phenomenon. In our history, back in the first century, different religious groups committed acts of terrorism. In the early Palestine, Jewish Zealots (CFR, 2004) publicly slit the throats of Romans and their allies to unleash terror in the midst of their enemies. In the 7th century, a band of roving religious cult in India called “Thuggees” attack passersby and sacrificed them to a Hindu Goddess Kali (CFR,2004).
In the Muslim world in the 11th century, ”Shiite,” members of the “second largest denomination of Islam and widely known as Assassins would put themselves under the influence of “hashish” (a psychoactive drug) before murdering their civilian enemies.
Acts of terrorism recorded in the late 18th and early 19th century in a more progressive form. The Russian revolutionary organization named Narodnaya Volya (Russian for “Peoples Will”) .
In 1914, considered one of the earliest successful terrorism and helped triggered World War I was the assassination of Austrian Archduke by a Serb extremist.
The first televised terrorist hijacking of a commercial airline perpetrated by the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine in July 22, 1968 (CFR, 2004). The PFLP, a Palestinian terrorist group who pioneered terror tactics like airline hijacking was formed in 1967(CFR, 2004). Two years later, in 1970, PFLP managed to hijacked three more passenger planes and blew them in the Jordanian airfields (CFR, 2004).
Probably inspired by the Jordan airfield incident, terrorist bombing spree began with Air India in 1985 and PAN AM flight 103 in 1988 that killed 300 people. The 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and finally the September 11, 2001 attack in New York (CFR, 2004).
DIFFERENCES and SIMILARITES of Walter Laqueur, FBI, CIA, and the State Department
For Walter Laqueur, terrorism is link to nationalist, ethnic, religious, tribal conflict and it may come from poverty, unemployment, backwardness, and inequality (Laqueur, 2004)
The FBI described it as either domestic or international depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist. Use of force or violence by an individual or group operating within a territory in the U.S. (domestic) without foreign direction. International terrorism is a violent act endangering human lives operating outside the United States or transcends national boundaries.
The CIA said there are four key elements of terrorism. It is premeditated rather than an impulsive act of rage. Political and not criminal, referring to the violence of Mafia to raise money for political change. Terrorism aimed at civilians and not military personnel or installations. Terrorism is sub national groups and does not represent an army of a country (CFR, 2004).
With the State Department definition which is identical to CIA but with the emphasis on terrorism that usually intended to influence an audience (CFR, 2004).
Studying and analyzing the definitions of these different groups will tell us that are indeed varying beliefs regarding the true nature of terrorism and difference in the groups who interprets them. Walter Laqueur, a civilian author and co-chair of International Research Council sees terrorism as an outcome of a deep social, political, and religious conflict. His definition of terrorism maybe regarded as the most useful among the other three government agencies. The FBI, CIA and the State Department definition is giving more emphasis on territorial and political issues rather than the source of terrorism.
We cannot expect the CIA as an intelligence arm of the government which has a primitive and theoretical understanding of terrorism to have more interest in the roots. Like the FBI and the other agencies, people who do business with terrorism professionally be likely to think of it as doctors do sickness with no cure, or as police do crime. Like an ill of the human situation to be attended one case at a time. For them, it is just a problem to be managed but never to be solved. It is not a surprising if FBI misses the subject and fails to act precisely on information regarding the terrorist threats. The FBI was constituted as a law enforcement agency empower in solving crimes that had already taken place and not an intelligence force (like the CIA) to prevent an attack (CFR, 2004).
WHAT MAKES AN ACT TERRORISM?
Whenever an individual or group systematically uses terror as a means of compulsion against a person, government and the public to attain an objective is an act of terrorism. This is apparent with the authorities definition of terrorism that is being “perpetrated against noncombatants” (CFR, 2004) which are clearly innocent civilians who were put to death just to capture the attention of political or religious group. To identify a terrorist act, one must realize the deliberate use of violence against helpless civilians (CFR, 2004) or destructive actions against properties and defenseless individual. This is true considering the fact that nobody can terrorized an “armed” civilian.
ARE TERRORIST CRIMINALS?
Killing is a crime and terrorist fundamental objective is to kill and capture the attention of the public. Let us remember that terrorist do not represent a government or a country and we cannot consider them as soldiers of war. Terrorist are simply criminals in pursuit of their one sided objective using helpless human beings as shield and object of their brutality. In the history of terrorism as stated in CFR article, terrorist attack were usually premeditated and aimed on helpless victim. The CIA’s primitive theory of terrorism which is “political and not criminal”(CFR, 2004) is not applicable to our present time. The fact that Paul Pillar of CIA was comparing the act of terrorism to the Mafia’s violent acts for political change is entirely ridiculous and unfounded. The intensity of destruction and mass killing perpetrated by the terrorist in the September 11, 2001 attack in New York definitely made a mockery of the Mafia’s small time killing spree. Whatever the argument, objective, purpose, religion, affiliation a person or group in any situation do not have the right to kill. We are all bound to abide and judged by the law and by the same law terrorist beyond reasonable doubt are criminals.
Consequence Management: Terrorism Preparation and Response
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INTRODUCTION
Mandated by congress, TOPOFF or Top Officials Exercise is designed to the strengthen the United States defense and recovery procedure against large scale terrorist attack. It is a cycle happen every two years with a series of seminars, planning events and finally a national exercise that simulates a coordinated terrorist attack. This involves simulated WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) such as biological, chemical (Pneumonic Plague, Mustard Gas etc) and radiological.
The exercise main objective is to gain the attention of Top Officials and key personnel from all rank of government who have domestic response and consequence management roles and responsibilities in a real terrorist event ( OIG-06-07 page 1).
The third in the series of TOPOFF, TOPOFF3 conducted in April of 2004 is a full scale exercise sponsored and managed by the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. TOPOFF3 promises to be the most ambitious in the series with the incorporation additional elements such as intelligence community and private sector participation.
OPINION ON THE DRILL
TOPOFF3 like the earlier exercises to prepare the nation to terrorist attack and weapons of mass destruction was designed to strengthen the capacity to prevent an eminent large-scale attack. It will greatly improve emergency response and recovery from destructive terrorist acts. The exercise is a good initiative by the congress that would enhance counter-terrorism efforts and most of all save lives.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT/DRILL
TOPOFF 3 actually began on March 4, 2005 with a simulation to test the U.S. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies to sense or disrupt fictionalized terrorist plot. This enables participants to exercise against realistic and adaptive opponents wherein they can completely utilize their operational actions and analysis. The exercise is limited only to information gathering and down playing the prevention part of intelligence works. The reason for this is the necessity for the fictionalized terrorist to launch an attack for the next exercise.
The next exercise commenced on April 4-8, 2005, which was aim to evaluate federal, state, and local top official’s decision-making aptitude in response to a series of incorporated and geographical isolated terrorist threats and acts. This is where terrorist attacks in various locations with different scenarios are simulated. Recreation of Pneumonic plagues attack in Union and MiddleSex counties, New Jersey. Mustard Gas and High Yield Explosives in the City of New London and Connecticut (OIG-06-07, page 4). As part of the partnership to strengthen security, communication, and information sharing among United Kingdom (Atlantic Blue Exercise) and Canada (Triple Play Exercise), these linked exercise activities conducted. TOPOFF3 is 2 days longer and it includes the private sector, which was not in TOPOFF2.
Other activities include the Command Post Exercise aimed to test and evaluate individual capabilities, multiple functions, or activities within a function. This is where movement of personnel and equipment is simulated. This is to test the coordination among federal departments and other government agencies. A three day Advanced Distance Learning Exercise, an event that uses satellite broadcast and secured website to disseminate information and provide education and training to improve domestic incident management capabilities in response to Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorist attack (OIG-06-07, page 4). Large Scale Games where participants play and address long term recovery and remediation issues. (27 Federal Depts., 30 States, 44 Local, and 156 Private Sectors) The scope of play involved establishing incident scenes and required first responders to carry out actions typically associated with an preliminary reaction to a terrorist occurrence. Those actions consist of victim rescue, triage, treatment, decontamination, hazard identification, site security, crowd control, render-safe procedures on devices or weapons, monitoring for contamination, contamination control, and device recovery and packaging (OIG-06-07, page 5).
KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES
Federal (Intelligence Community)
The role of the intelligence community is to play simulated intelligence works such data gathering and analysis. This will check their potential to detect and disrupt terrorist plots as early as possible. They will also give the other participants important information that would be use for the next stage of the exercise.
States
As part of the objectives of TOPOFF, exercises to test the states relationships among local agencies along with their coordination and decision-making capabilities in response to a simulated terrorist attack.
Local Top Officials
Local officials would play in simulated incident scenes that would test their actions as part of the initial response in a terrorist attack. Actions such decision making, victim rescue, crowd control etc.
Private Sector
They are part of the strategic coordination of media relations and public information. This would test information dissemination of the private sector, federal, states, and local organizations. It has the primary federal responsibility for coordinating communications with private critical infrastructure sectors during crisis events.
KEY AGENTS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
Four functional areas as objectives or means to achieve TOPOFF3 goals and broaden growth and analysis of the NPG (National Preparedness Goal).
First is the “Incident Management,” this is to test complete range of available domestic incident procedures in response to WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Through assessment and exercise, it will help top officials to enhance their capabilities to react in partnership whenever there is an attack. Federal, state, and local department and agencies working together to surmount differences and to attain consensus on different issues pertinent to their individual domestic preparedness roles and responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS.
Second, is the operational and time critical international “Intelligence and Investigation” alliance coordinated by United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. This will test the flow of intelligence information involving participating countries in response to terrorist occurrences. The objective was to review agency analysis and allocation of exercise intelligence through existing intelligence network. Intelligence reports will give analyst with a prospect to identify and avert the threat and will facilitate top officials to build key decisions.
Third, are the “strategic coordination of media relations and public information” issues between participating countries. Coordination will allow participants to investigate communication plans, refurbish media management and communication proficiency, coordinate information, and communicate transversely participating departments as well as with the public. An opportunity for participants to utilize information collection method and use various information propagation techniques.
Last is the ”evaluation” process, which will identify lesson learned and uphold most excellent practices. This process divided into 3 steps: a) Observation – collection of data. b) Reconstruction- determining what occurred and when it occurred. c) Analysis – determining why specific actions or events occurred.
DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR FINDINGS CONCERNING CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
In general, targets based on the four primary objectives were met but some areas in the exercise need further dialogue and analysis.
The incorporation and participation of Private Sector and Department of Defense were partially successful due to the lack of efficient information sharing procedures between the private sector and the federal government. However, there are benefits achieved from their interaction, which enhanced their understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities under the NRP and identified probable unnecessary areas and replication of efforts. Overall, TOPOFF3 made progress in elevating private sector visibility in national preparedness, response, and recovery planning.
Success achieved in engaging Top Officials at all levels of government. They were involved in the decision-making process and incident management all through the exercise even though their participation was not constant.
MAIN LESSONS LEARNED
During the planning stage, the observers learned that FEMA’s (Federal Emergency Management Agency) level of participation is limited. They were not actively participating in the exercise groundwork due to development and communication intricacies. However, majority of these concern were settled and FEMA made sizeable progress meeting its committed degree of participation (OIG-O6-07, Page 9).
In previous TOPOFF exercises, the majority of federal efforts to develop a national strategy for terrorism do not consider the participation of the private sector, which according to DHS (Department of Homeland Security) is a critical component in achieving a integrated approach. Integration of the private sector needs supplementary attention and a better comprehension of NRP and NIMS. Additional training for the private sector needed to have a more realistic integration into the planning process and later partake in the exercise (OIG-06-07, page 10).
SLGCP learned the limitations and restrictions imposed by law to the Department of Defense to directly participate in domestic emergency preparedness and response. DoD (a National Entity) emergency response contribution is only supplemental support to civil or local agencies. For future exercises, SLGCP will identify the events, operating procedures and method necessary for DoD activation to work in partnership with other federal agencies. SLGCP will also include the DoD participation in NRP and NIMS training to congeal its role and tasks for Homeland Security (OIG-06-07, page 10-11).
EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNOLOGIES
a. Confusion over the different roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal Federal Official and Federal Coordinating Officer. PFO is designated by DHS secretary to act as a “local representative in overseeing and executing the incident management” (OIG-06-07, page 13) but do not have authority over law enforcement, FCO and other state and federal officials. Whereas FCO (designated by the President) do have the authority under the Stafford Act to request and direct federal departments and agencies to use their authorities and resources. Moreover, PFO lack of guidance on training and certification standards of its personnel (OIG-06-07, page 13).
b. Participants noted the unrealistic or premature deployment of large-scale federal assets, which they said FEMA (in real situation) would have initially deployed small Emergency Response Team to the State Emergency Operations Centers. Furthermore, Joint Field Offices would not have established until “six or seven days into the incident” (OIG-06-07, page 13).
c. The change over malfunction from the Incident Command System to the Unified Command Post. Confusion over participants reverting to the Federal Response Plan and the Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan rather than follow the NRP and NIMS and some Departments and Agencies that would usually operate within the post structure were not signified (OIG-06-07, page 13).
d. Effective Public Information and Media Relations through Joint Information Centers. Real world media and VIP’s were able to monitor TOPOFF3 and attained better understanding of goals and objectives of the exercises. Further enhanced comprehension of federal, state, and local preparedness and response capabilities. Effectiveness of SLGCP in conveying to media and the public that events are simulated. VNN (SLGCP contractor to create virtual news organization) covered domestic and international venues to simulate real world media coverage. VNN reporting events as they unfolded where participants can watch activities live. Participants noted that the role of VNN media was realistic and educational and it enables participants to carry out their communication objectives effectively. (OIG-06-07, page 19-20)
e. Achievement in engaging Top Officials in all levels of government. Officials were involved in crucial decision-making processes throughout the exercise which is instrumental to implementing the NRP (OIG-06-07, page 20)
REFERENCES
Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, “Terrorism: An Introduction”, [online], http://cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/introduction.html
DHS-OIG(OIG-06-07), 2005, “Office of the Inspections and Special Reviews.” [online], http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-07_Nov05.pdf
Laqueur W., 2004. “The Terrorism to Come”, [online], http://www.policyreview.org/aug04/laqueur.html
